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Introduction
While the movement to reform health care is not new, the
understanding of the health of a population, its determinants
and ways to improve it has become far more sophisticated in
recent times. Approaches to reform efforts have had to take
into account the broader definition of health as a social con-
struct as well as the economic, political and social contexts in
which health services are provided.
For decades now, and in response to various pressures,
developed and developing countries alike have been taking
steps to change the policies and practices of their health
systems (Sen and Koivusal 1998). In its modern sense, health
sector reform (HSR) has featured prominently on the inter-
national health policy agenda since the late 1980s. What char-
acterizes this contemporary version of HSR – and perhaps
sets it apart from previous types of reform – is its association
with ‘a particular set of policy prescriptions’ aiming at insti-
tutional and financial reform, principally introducing increas-
ing market mechanisms in health care provision (Standing
1999). In the developing world, such reform has been largely,
though not solely, donor-sponsored, with the World Bank
assuming a leading role.
To date, there have been numerous examples of World Bank-
supported HSR initiatives worldwide, driven by similar initial
definitions and conceptual tenets. However, reform remains
a highly context-dependent process. Even when dealing with
the same political and financial driving forces, reform options
and the realities of implementation diverge. This is partly due
to conditions, which vary from country to country, such as the
relative presence of political interest, will and capacity to
implement reform (Standing 1999). Existing models seem to
take as given certain pre-conditions, such as the presence of
at least a general consensus regarding the ways in which
society should proceed on its path to development, strong
state institutions and structures, a relatively open and active
economy, a vibrant civil society, rational action in policy-
making, and the availability of minimum household and
national resources. In fact these pre-conditions may not all be
present in a particular setting. The structural conditions
within which health systems develop and the constraints
imposed by a particular setting must have an impact on the
way in which reform can or cannot proceed. Such realities call
for flexibility in approaching reform in differing contexts and
for the exercise of great care regarding universal policies
adopted by international aid agencies for implementation in
sometimes very differing settings.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), as in other
contexts, the structure, function and capacity of the health
system has been shaped largely by the country’s complex
political history. Since the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords
and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in
1994, reform activities have been taking place in the health
sector with the involvement of several international aid and
United Nations (UN) agencies as well as local and inter-
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This
paper will take a critical look at recent developments in the
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health sector in the OPT, with the aim of contributing to the
debate on whether the current approach to reforming the
health care system can be effective in fulfilling people’s
health needs. Specifically, the paper attempts to analyze the
defects of the current approaches to reform by showing that,
in the Palestinian case, the assumptions of the pre-conditions
described above are simply and fundamentally flawed.
Indeed, the Palestinian case of HSR demonstrates the inter-
relatedness of health and politics and the importance of an
analysis of health needs within a systemic context. Basing
that analysis solely on biological and medical indicators,
divorced from the social and environmental determinants,
may lead investors in reform to the illusion that narrow tech-
nical and administrative solutions can solve complex health
problems. In the Palestinian case, this microcosmic rather
than systemic focus has led to investments in unworkable
strategies. In this article, we will attempt to unravel where
HSR, intended to engender a sustainable process (Berman
1995), has missed the forest for the trees, thus resulting in
wasted resources and frustrated expectations. A description
is necessary first of the geopolitical context and historical
evolution of the Palestinian health system, in order to under-
stand the root causes of its current difficulties. The paper will
then analyze what have been, in our assessment, the major
obstacles undermining reform approaches.
Perhaps it is important to point out that this paper does not
attempt to evaluate the impact of reform initiatives imple-
mented so far. In our opinion, such an evaluation is not
possible at this time, both because of the ongoing state of
conflict and destabilization of Palestinian Authority systems,
including the health system, and because of the relatively
short amount of time that has elapsed since the beginning
of the reform initiatives (in this case, since the signing of
the Oslo Peace Accords and the establishment of the Pales-
tinian Ministry of Health). However, with evidence of
systemic collapse even before the renewal of the second
Palestinian Uprising (Intifada), it seemed important to reflect
on and question the approach to reform that has been taken
so far.
While it is recognized that the situation of this developing
country is a complex one, where rapid changes and political
instability make it difficult to plan for the future, it is a key
moment to take a critical look at health sector reform, as
governmental systems are being established and policies are
being formulated. Investigating the context in which changes
in the health sector have taken place might contribute to a
clearer vision of what is needed and what might be realizable
in the future. Furthermore, in its broader framework, the
Palestinian experience may also assist in improving our
understanding of reform efforts in other countries of the
world that endure endemic conflict and instability.
The geopolitical context of the Palestinian health
care system
The modern geography of the OPT can only be understood
in the context of its political history.1 Today, the OPT, a
combined area of 6000 km2, are divided into two geographi-
cally distinct territorial units, the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip separated by the State of Israel (World Bank 1998). The
West Bank and Gaza, differing in their natural landscape,
population distribution and legal systems, are inhabited by
about 2.9 million individuals (including Arab East
Jerusalem), of whom 65% reside in the West Bank (Palestin-
ian Central Bureau of Statistics 1999: 39). The latter has a low
population density (230 inhabitants per km2) with about one-
fifth of the population consisting of refugees, whereas Gaza
is ‘one of the most densely populated areas of the world’, with
2100 inhabitants per km2, of whom 65% are refugees
(Khawaja 2000).
Approximately 47% of the Palestinian population is below 15
years of age (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1999:
49). Certain health and development indicators show import-
ant disparities between the two regions. For example, the
total fertility rate (TFR) in the West Bank is 5.44 compared
with 7.41 in the Gaza Strip, and the infant mortality rate
(IMR) is 25.5 and 30.2 per 1000 live births in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, respectively (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics 1998a). In 1998, the West Bank and Gaza had a
GNP per capita of US$1800 and as such were categorized as
a lower-middle income economy by the World Bank.
However, since the year 2000, per capita incomes have
drastically decreased with the collapse of the Palestinian
economy, due primarily to restrictions on movement of
people and goods. It was estimated that by the beginning of
2002 not less than 45–50% of the Palestinian population were
living below the poverty line (of US$2 per person per day)
(World Bank 2002: iv).
It is noteworthy that the geographical divisions aggravated by
the political conditions of the past several years have
produced two separate de facto government health systems,
one for Gaza and the other for the West Bank. This point
seems to be missed by donors and current reform policies.
The situation on the ground has led to the near impossibility
of unifying and standardizing the two geographically isolated
health sectors, creating redundancy in positions and bureau-
cracy and widening the already existing gap between the two
regions. All these developments are antithetical to the goal
of efficient health sector reform.
The evolution of the Palestinian health care
system
Historical events during the past century have had a
profound influence on the characteristics of the health system
emerging today. Years of colonization and military occu-
pation have shaped the capacity of the health system and
defined its main actors. The evolution of the Palestinian
health care system will be described in four eras: the British
Mandate period (1920–48), the Jordanian and Egyptian rule
(1948–67), Israeli Administration (1967–94) and the Pales-
tinian Authority (1994–2000). The start of the second Pales-
tinian Uprising in September 2000 marked a new reality,
which changed living conditions in the country as a whole and
necessarily radically influenced the functioning of the health
system. The events since 2000 will also be considered in this
paper.
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Services during the British Mandate Period, 1920–48, and
Jordanian and Egyptian Rule, 1948–67
Following World War I, with Palestine under the British
Mandate, health services were provided by the Government
Department of Health under the British Civil Administration
between 1920–48. While some government hospitals and
health clinics were provided for the Arab population, British
colonial policy aimed to limit investments in the social
services in the region, and thus the rural areas of the country,
where most of the poor Palestinian population resided, had
very limited access to medical services. Many city dwellers
were able to utilize the Christian Mission hospitals and the
government hospitals in the major Palestinian cities.
The 1948 Arab–Israeli War brought about the creation of the
State of Israel and the displacement of the Palestinian popu-
lation, whereby approximately 750 000 Palestinians became
refugees (Sanbar 1984: 202). Immediately after the war, while
Jordan ruled the West Bank and Egypt administered the
Gaza Strip, two separate health systems began to emerge.
Furthermore, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1949 and began opera-
tions in 1950, with the mandate to ‘carry out direct relief and
works programmes for Palestine refugees’.2 Thus, as of the
late 1950s, modern medical services began to become avail-
able to refugees and to the rural areas, as basic health and
education infrastructures reached the countryside. However,
those health services were mainly curative and rudimentary
(Giacaman 1994).
The Palestinian health system under Israeli Administration:
1967–94
On the eve of the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza by Israel, there were three systems for health service
provision operating in the area. The governments of Jordan
and Egypt supervised the public system in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, respectively, while UNRWA provided health
services for refugees. The private sector included charitable
organizations operating major hospitals and diagnostic
centres or primary care centres. Following the occupation,
the Israeli Civil Administration (under the Ministry of
Defense and not the Ministry of Health) took over the
governmental health care system and proceeded to adminis-
ter it in a manner that kept it stunted and underdeveloped,
with severe budget restrictions, referral to Israeli hospitals
for tertiary care, and restrictions on licenses for new medical
and health care projects, thus creating a total dependence on
the Israeli health system (Giacaman 1994). In addition,
health service delivery in that era was characterized by the
disempowerment of the Palestinians in decision-making and
top-level management. Although the actual service providers
were all Palestinians, institutions were not developed to meet
the changing needs and growth of the Palestinian population,
nor were they strengthened so that they could function
autonomously.
UNRWA was able to develop its own system of basic services,
including health, education, relief and social services, for the
refugees relatively independently. However, with the highly
centralized administration in Vienna, the bureaucratic struc-
ture did not foster Palestinian capacity building and leader-
ship at the top echelon. As for the private sector, operating
small hospitals and basic medical clinics owned and run by
individual physicians on a fee-for-service basis, it attempted
to provide an independent alternative in health service pro-
vision, but was subject to Israeli military rules and licensing
restrictions that prohibited any serious development. In
defiance and in response to the acute needs of the population,
grassroots popular health committees, affiliated with Pales-
tinian political movements, emerged in the late 1970s.
Although small, they were determined to fill the gaps left by
the Israelis in health service provision. These active and
activist NGOs based their approach on reaching out to
underserved areas with volunteer health providers and pro-
moting preventive care, health education activities, popular
participation in addressing health issues and grassroots
mobilization in addition to basic curative services (Bargh-
outhi and Giacaman 1990).
The health system under the Palestinian Authority:
1994–2000
In 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) signed an historic Declaration of Principles followed
by a 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,
which set the stage for the creation of the Palestinian Auth-
ority (PA) later that year. A subsequent series of negotiations
and agreements resulted in further phased-out transfer of
powers and responsibilities to the PA, including overall
responsibility for health care provision. The Palestinian
Ministry of Health (MoH) was established in 1994. In the
current context, the Ministry of Health is the primary
provider of health services to the population, with about 40%
of primary health care visits taking place at government
facilities, 31% at UNRWA and 29% at private and NGO
facilities (Policy Research Incorporated 1999: 6).
The enormous task of rebuilding the ailing system has been
aided by substantial donor assistance. Between 1994 and mid-
1999, donors committed some US$353 million to the health
sector and disbursed approximately half of that amount in
actual assistance (Government of Japan and World Bank
2000: 43). HSR projects in the past years have focused on
upgrading and expanding infrastructure, institution building
within the Ministry and human resource development.
Accomplishments have been considerable in constructing
new hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza and in increasing
the number of government primary health care clinics from
207 to 365 between 1994 and 1998,3 as well as gradually inte-
grating family planning services initially into about 100 of
these clinics. The ministerial structure was set up; a national
health information system was developed; a government
health insurance scheme was promoted; a plan for human
resource development was developed and training carried
out in certain areas such as women’s health; and participatory
planning with the four categories of service providers
(government, UNRWA, NGO and private) in developing
policies and protocols in maternal and child health was
undertaken.
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Expanded coverage of government health insurance has also
been one of the priorities of the Ministry of Health, which
succeeded in increasing the number of adherents between
1994 and 1998 from 25% of households to 48% (Policy
Research Incorporated 1999: 6), but with considerable
mandatory coverage for the employees of the state in
addition to police and security personnel. However, the
financial crisis of the Ministry of Health beginning in the
second half of 1997, when the Ministry of Finance failed to
allocate it the expected budget, led to a deterioration of
government services including a lack of essential drugs and
supplies. This in turn resulted in a decline in public partici-
pation in the governmental health insurance programme
(Economic Policy Research Institute 2000). Direct out-of-
pocket household expenditure on medical care has come to
account for 40% of total health expenditure in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (Policy Research Incorporated 1999: 4),
raising concerns about equity in health care, particularly
given rising poverty and the needs of the thousands injured
by the Israeli army, who require long-term care.
Faced with the new situation on the ground, the role of non-
governmental health organizations began to change in
several respects. Certain NGOs have had to downsize their
operations, while others remain significant providers of
essential services, such as primary care services, community-
based rehabilitation, mental health schemes and health edu-
cation, and they constitute a vital platform for debate on
issues of health policy and planning, centralization/decen-
tralization, coordination and information-sharing. While the
private sector has expanded rapidly in the past few years
(Barghouthi and Lennock 1997: 22–3), with phenomena such
as group practices and private health insurance schemes
beginning to develop, the extent to which its practices are
monitored and regulated as well as the implications for the
public sector of its rapid growth remain unclear.
Major obstacles to HSR initiatives
The following section outlines what, in our view, have been
the major obstacles to reforming the health sector. Basically,
it analyzes the faulty underlying assumptions of the presence
of certain pre-conditions in the Palestinian context that are
necessary for genuine and effective reform. Those include a
stable, peaceful political environment with an active
economy, strong state institutions and structures, internal
political and popular will to implement reform, and the
presence of a policy dialogue on what types of reforms the
country should invest in.
Ongoing conflict and the assumption of transition to peace-
building
Reform initiatives in the OPT have taken a path similar to
those in other post-conflict situations in the sense that they
were based on the assumption that the country was entering
a period of peace-building and political transition following
prolonged conflict.4 In fact, however, the Oslo period proved
to yield a contrary reality that consistently undermined HSR
initiatives. Despite the apparent progress in state building
that began with the Oslo peace process, the situation on the
ground remained highly problematic. By 1998, it had become
clear that a final and peaceful solution to the long conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians was not materializing, and
old problems were deepening as the post-Oslo period was
marked by severe economic deprivation, a seemingly perma-
nent bantustanization and isolation of villages and towns
(Figure 1), restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian
population, and increasing expropriation of land and natural
resources for settlement expansion or bypass roads. In short,
the process had come to be perceived by Palestinians as
entailing a string of negative economic, social, political and
human consequences. The area had undergone continuous
crises after the signing of the Accords (Giacaman and
Lonning 1998: ix–x), and in September 2000, despite the
massive international aid that had been poured into the
country to buffer the deteriorating situation on the ground,
the political interim solution exploded with the second Pales-
tinian Uprising (Intifada), leading to a very serious under-
mining of already fragile public institutions and services.
Overnight, these events drove the OPT into an unprece-
dented economic crisis with at least half of the population
living under the poverty line by the beginning of 2002 (World
Bank 2002). In addition, the death of over a thousand Pales-
tinians, the injury of thousands more, and the substantial
destruction of property and infrastructure including roads, as
well as the shelling and occasional ramsacking of hospitals,
all contributed further to the precipitation of a health system
crisis, undoing to a considerable extent donor-led attempts at
reform. The situation since the re-invasion of Palestinian-
controlled areas beginning on 29 March 2002 has become
even more critical.
Endeavours to build capacity within the Ministry of Health
and within health institutions were foiled by the overwhelm-
ing need to meet the emergency situation. This focus on
emergency needs, however, has led to the abandonment of
the goal of system-building. Reform attempts turned once
again to relief, dwarfing, for instance, years of work in
developing an essential drug list and a rational drug use pro-
gramme, and interrupting the debate on how to finance
government health services, such as introducing user fees. In
response to the national emergency, the Ministry of Health
began, quite rightly, to provide free services to the insured
and un-insured alike and to receive drug donations from
international donors that undermined the use of its essential
drug list, undoing its attempts at rehabilitating prescription
patterns and along the way, further weakening the local drug
industry.
Thus the ongoing national liberation struggle and conflict
with Israel is not only proving to be protracted and seemingly
never-ending, but also making current reform efforts seem
impossible to achieve. This means that, although one should
not give up on attempts at reform, assumptions pertaining to
a post-conflict setting in the OPT must be modified to suit the
harsh reality of ongoing strife. Policies need to be guided by
the principle of mixing selected possible and realizable
reform measures with relief and emergency operations,
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Otherwise, reform opera-
tions are likely to be frustrated by events.
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Weakened Palestinian state structures and institutions
The nature and functioning of PA structures: dependence and
authoritarianism
In order to understand the political system and policy
environment in which reform has been attempted in the OPT,
and consequently assess the feasibility and the potential for
success of reform schemes, one needs first to examine the
nature of the Palestinian regime that emerged in the post
Oslo period. The policy environment is characterized by
dependence: political dependence as defined by the Oslo
Accords and economic dependence on the Israeli market and
international assistance. Within this context, the state-like
structure has emerged. As early as 1997, various analysts
began to note that what appears to be a process of modern
state building was not necessarily characteristic of the reality
on the ground. The use of customary law and the promotion
of extended families and kinship groups by the PA were
beginning to be questioned as perhaps part of a ‘broad
strategy for de-politicizing society and centralizing power by
weakening modern groups and strengthening tradition’
(Frisch 1997: 342).
Others also began to note the emergence of an authoritarian
regime, increasingly constraining the development and
expansion of civil society, which cannot develop or last
without the protection afforded by democratic structures.
Soon, analysts began to conclude that the emerging govern-
ment is taking the one-party state form, yet functioning as a
neo-patrimonial bureaucratic regime with monopoly of
political power (Hilal 1998a, b). These internal strains,
increasing over time, converged with Palestinian perceptions
that the Oslo agreements are unjust and detrimental to the
national interests, as the agreement did not satisfy the legiti-
mate demands of an occupied people for independent state-
hood, nor did it inhibit the continuing Israeli colonialist
expansion in Palestinian areas, undermining even the meagre
possibilities of creating peace. The Palestinian Authority
came to be perceived as incapable of transforming itself into
a democracy as long as it remained confined to the Oslo
framework. The relationship between the population and the
Figure 1. Palestinian Bantustans in the West Bank
PA thus became increasingly conflict-ridden (Giacaman
1998).
In a critical expose of the workings of the PA, Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) Member Azmi Shu’aybi revealed
facts and processes that could only undermine most attempts
at health sector reform (Shuaybi and Shikaki 2000: 90). He
raises questions that are important for the present argument,
namely, the relationship between political processes and the
absence of genuine reform. For instance, he notes that the
civil service, which numbered around 20 000 when taken over
by the PA from the Israeli military government, was inflated
to 70 000–75 000 in a period of only 5 years. According to
Shu’aybi, salaries in this sector account for 60 to 70% of
public expenditure, resulting from unnecessary appointments
in compensation for revolutionary heroism, current political
support or both, and constituting a major drain on the
national budget. He notes that the cabinet hardly ever meets,
leading to an absence of collective decision-making, inte-
grated planning and the adoption of general policy lines.
Thus, he claims, the Planning Minister formulates the PA
development plan, but other ministers, as a result of this solo
performance, become unwilling to work in accordance with
this plan that they did not help formulate. Overall, the picture
that he paints is not only chaotic, but also tragic in terms of
the absence of potential for reform.
In the health sector, the ramifications of such a system of rule
can be far-reaching, as the need to coordinate at the inter-
sectoral level with other ministries, such as education,
housing, environment, agriculture and food supplies is para-
mount. In addition, the limitations of the Oslo accords for a
public health approach are evident, in particular the virtual
absence of control by the PA over water, land, the environ-
ment and the movement of people and goods (Sayigh and
Shikaki 1999: 25), Israel having maintained its control in
these areas. While one can argue that some reform projects
can still succeed in the context of this particular policy
environment, the fact remains that such attempts are likely
to be limited to the domain of medical care and not to public
health care. For example, water projects became a high
priority for donor countries, as the amounts of water avail-
able to the Palestinian population do not meet the UN stan-
dards for the minimum requirement per capita, while ‘per
capita supplies to Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza
are roughly four times higher than the amount supplied to the
Palestinian population’ (World Bank and UNSCO 1999: 17).
However, many of these projects aimed at expanding the
water supply have been delayed or abandoned due to the
difficulty of receiving permits from the Israeli government for
their implementation.
The limited capacity of Palestinian health institutions to
implement reforms
To its credit, the health system in the post-Oslo period has
registered many achievements despite the occupation’s
legacy of neglect and underdevelopment. However, despite
those accomplishments in the government sector, the rapid
increase in MoH employees from 2000 to 7000 persons
(Sayigh and Shikaki 1999: 93) and numerous training courses,
it is not evident that the quality of care has improved, even
prior to the destruction attendant upon the Intifada that
began in September 2000. This may be partially attributed to
the difficulty in strengthening weak institutions in times of
instability, where crisis management has become the routine.
Institution building, based on an inexperienced adminis-
tration that is externally financed by multiple donors in a
context of rapid political and economic change, is complex
and frustrating. Israeli control over many aspects of develop-
ment in OPT adds to the complexity of the process. The
limited regulatory role of the Ministry of Health as well as the
Palestinian people’s growing disillusionment with the lack of
transparency, accountability and participatory approach of
the PA in general (Government of Japan and World Bank
2000: xvii) have affected public institutions. The government
sector with its low pay scale, aggravated by the depreciation
of the Israeli currency, has made it difficult to attract the most
qualified health providers and technicians (Sayigh and
Shikaki 1999: 96), and many public sector physicians supple-
ment their salaries with a private practice. Political pressures
have influenced how human resources are utilized in the
health sector, not always in the most rational or effective
manner. Thus physicians are carrying out some tasks that
might be better accomplished by other types of health pro-
viders, creating concerns of sustainability for the health
system, in addition to the acceptability of services, as in the
case of women who prefer health care from female providers
while the large majority of physicians are male. The issue of
the effectiveness of extensive training courses offered to
certain health providers has also been raised, where the
criteria for selection of participants, the training methods
utilized (primarily in the classroom rather than on-the-job),
and the supervision and follow-up in the field require further
consideration.
Donor policies and practices
Overall donor aid for the Palestinians has been described as
‘one of the largest ever undertaken by the international com-
munity, in both absolute and per capita terms’ (Sayigh and
Shikaki 1999: 28), amounting to US$175 per person (World
Bank Group 2001: 1). Of total donor aid, 8% was allocated
to the health sector, nearly half of this financial support
coming from Japan (33%) and Spain (15%) (World Bank and
UNSCO 1999: 26–7). According to the World Bank, one of
the numerous challenges facing development in the OPT is
the involvement of ‘more than forty donors, over two dozen
multilateral organizations and UN agencies, and hundreds of
local and international NGOs in the development effort’
(Government of Japan and World Bank 2000: ix). In many
cases, external assistance has mobilized excessive human
resources and created more fragmentation than cooperation.
The efforts of many professional cadres in the health sector
are often directed towards acquiring and maintaining donor
funds, keeping them out of their fields of practice, where they
are most needed to maintain continuity in the implemen-
tation of projects. In some cases, donor preferences for
funding rather than the actual needs determined in a perspec-
tive of sustainable development have defined the very nature
of the projects themselves. Technical assistance, amounting
to 23% of donor disbursement to the health sector (World
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Bank and UNSCO 1999: 28), is frequently linked to assist-
ance from donor nationals, who often have limited time in the
field and are not familiar with the culture or the language.
Palestinian Authority officials and Palestinian researchers
report, respectively, that 70 and 90% of technical assistance
funds are spent on donor personnel or in donor countries,
totalling almost one-fifth of all donor aid (amounting to over
US$450 million between 1993–99) (Government of Japan
and World Bank 2000: 107). Monitoring and reporting pro-
cedures vary with each donor, creating excessive paper work
in a context of limited resources.
Donor approaches, procedures and mechanisms lack flexi-
bility and are often not adapted to the reality on the ground.
For example, the issue of the high Palestinian fertility rate
was addressed by a donor-supported move to increase access
to family planning services. Statistics show that lack of know-
ledge and cost are not prohibitive factors (Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics 1998b: 90). The approach, in itself, was
limited, given that the determinants of high fertility are far
more complex than the mere availability of modern contra-
ception,5 and because other means of dealing with the social
and economic injustice inherent in the problem were not
debated. Furthermore, the project design of broadening the
content and range of maternal health services by integrating
family planning into the existing services at the primary
health care clinics did not pay sufficient consideration to the
time and effort needed to improve the quality of care in weak
and overburdened institutions. Time limits and the frequent
donor requirements of rapidly measurable results lead to the
illusion of ‘quick fixes’, whereas the implementation of sus-
tainable health projects focused on quality are arduous tasks
often involving structural and behavioural changes, and
requiring repetition, supervision and on-going support.
The limited political analysis on the part of the donors in
relation to the major obstacles to health and well-being, and
their proven incapacity to influence change in the political
arena as a prerequisite to reforming the health system, have
often resulted in the non-sustainability and ineffectiveness of
projects. In contrast to this tunnel-vision approach to the
health of the population that limits its scope to increased
physical access, service efficiency and technical and mana-
gerial improvements, the Palestinian experience highlights
the importance of a primary and public health approach to
health and health care delivery. Preventing illness and pro-
moting health is a challenge that goes far beyond the pro-
vision of services, and a health-sustaining environment is an
essential component (McMichael and Beaglehole 2000). In
the case at hand, it appears that ideas for change in the health
sector focused exclusively on the physical access to health
services, rather than on the promotion of a healthy environ-
ment. The fact of the matter is, however, that the two are
inextricably linked, and that the former, if deprived of the
latter, cannot be effective.
The policy vacuum
The OPT still lacks a general development policy, and within
the context of this vacuum the World Bank is of growing
influence, especially in economic projects, but also in health
and other social sectors. Its policy is directed towards a free-
market economy, emphasizing the private sector (which is
minimally regulated) within the framework of structural
adjustment (Hilal 1998b: 124). But the OPT as a nation has
neither agreed to structural adjustment as the way forward,
nor to the economy being directed towards the free market,
although in the longer term, it has been argued, this may
indeed be the path to Palestinian development, a position
that is rather clearly stated in the Palestinian Development
Plan. On the other hand, it has also been argued that ‘the
philosophy of economic liberalization advocated by inter-
national organizations, the United States and the European
Union, given the de-developed condition of the Palestinian
economy inherited by the PA after three decades of Israeli
occupation, could only widen socio-economic and class
inequalities’ (Hilal 1998b: 124). This could undermine the
equity principle that is so important for reform to which inter-
national aid usually pays lip service while proceeding instead
in the direction of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
In its Medium Term Development Strategy for the Health
Sector, the World Bank emphasizes that, in cooperation with
the PA’s Ministry of Health, it will assess the health sector in
terms of the efficiency and the quality of its service, the sus-
tainability of present financial arrangements and equity and
accessibility to services (World Bank 1998: 1). The intentions
expressed are admirable. However, the document then
proceeds to delineate the path to reform in almost entirely
economic terms, where access and equity appear to be con-
flated, and where access is elaborated in terms of ‘afford-
ability of premiums’, ‘ability to pay’ and focusing on
physical/distance access. Other definitions, including equity
in quality and social access, were not given due consideration,
even when acknowledging political and economic trends such
as high unemployment, declining wages and the existence of
a large informal sector.
Moreover, the World Bank also realizes that to achieve its
objectives in the health sector, changes in the nature and pro-
cesses of decision making and budgetary allocations are
crucial for efficiency and cost-effectiveness (particularly in
relation to the appointment system with its implications for
the health budget, the necessity for decentralization in the
decision making and managerial structures, and in budgetary
allocation and transparency). Yet, as the World Bank also
notes, aid ‘is a fundamentally political process’, and in the
Palestinian case, the primary function of international aid is
to sell the fragile and flawed peace process to the Palestinian
people, by showing tangible results in their daily lives. Its
apparent lack of consideration for long-term development
needs and sustainability seem to contradict its very discourse.
Indeed, the World Bank recognizes the challenge that long-
term development and peace building efforts (the need to
show rapid tangible results) may not always be compatible.
Time has shown that it is difficult to sell a basically unjust
peace process with aid money, not only because the ‘peace
dividends’ have never materialized, but also because freedom
is still an issue for people who are struggling for self-determi-
nation. Serious attempts at health sector reform require a just
resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that the popu-
lation, and not only the PA, is willing to accept.
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If one then links these considerations to the increasingly
diminishing space for public discourse, the retreat of mass
organizations and the threat against civil society institutions
posed by the emerging regime, one can begin to see more
clearly what is possible and what is not possible to achieve
without reforming the political system itself first, instead of
simply working to implement HSR projects imported from
the outside.
Conclusion
Health sector reform processes in the developing world have
been known to neglect crucial issues and be led by ‘naïve’
assumptions (Thomason 1997). In the case of the OPT, an
unjust framework for peace resulting in ongoing conflict is a
main impediment to reform, transforming it into relief and
interrupting the build-up and consolidation of reform
initiatives. The events beginning on 29 March 2002, leading
to re-occupation of major towns and many villages, and the
resulting destruction of most PA and NGO structures, as well
as the collapse of the private sector and the economy, can
only emphasize how faulty these assumptions have been.
However, even in post-conflict situations, health develop-
ment is ‘contingent upon overcoming major structural obsta-
cles in these unstable and resource poor environments’
(Macrae et al. 1995: ix). In this situation, donors appear to
operate in a manner similar to that in other ‘post-conflict’
areas, seeking unsustainable quick impact solutions to health
system problems that took years to generate in a context
heavily burdened with under-development. They operate in
the absence of a comprehensive policy forum, neglecting
policy dialogue, and focusing on plans derived from donor
strategies instead. Although donor reports often mention the
importance of Palestinian ownership of the development
process, the reality is different. A World Bank report dis-
cussing who should take the lead in the aid coordination
process in this country states ‘with so many vested historical,
national, economic, commercial and political interests in this
very high-profile hotspot, it is unrealistic to expect that
donors will eventually cede the lead role solely to the Pales-
tinians’ (Balaj and Wallich 1999: 3). At the local level, even
the actual processes of consultation in relation to proposed
plans are flawed, appearing to some to be more rhetoric than
substance, precisely because of the defective nature of the
community participation processes. This appearance of
participation either takes the shape of ‘quick and dirty’ rapid
appraisals that often miss out on the needs of the most
vulnerable groups, such as women and children, or of ‘wish
list’ workshops directed usually towards the same con-
stituency, senior managers, some university personnel and a
few NGOs, to legitimize continuing with the policies and
strategies pre-determined by donors.
As is the case in other developing countries, the swiftness of
development planning in OPT to suit donor agendas and
budgetary deadlines ‘constitutes a major threat to appropri-
ate policy development’ (Macrae et al. 1995: xi). The political
motive of selling the peace process has only exacerbated the
situation. With planning taking place at an inappropriate
speed in relation to the requirements of the context, it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to address adequately the
serious structural and systemic problems that come in the
way of turning plans into successful realities. Increasing cen-
tralization, the absence of transparency, the weakening of
civil society and the consequent diminishing space for
demand-shaped reform and advocacy and the weak regu-
latory role of government, all work together to produce frus-
trating results. Frustrating because what we are witnessing is
an emerging crisis in government policy, in public credibility,
and in health financing, exacerbated by ill-conceived notions
of sustainability in a non-sustainable environment dictated by
war, instability and dependence. It is unrealistic to think that
a real partnership can exist in the inherently unequal
relationship of donor and beneficiary. Nevertheless, it is
imperative to be aware of the specific agendas and the limi-
tations of donor aid, to determine the priorities for health
sector reform within a contextual analysis, and to promote
public debate at all levels of the society. The Palestinians
need a clear vision and comprehensive health policy, based
on a conception that includes a health-promoting environ-
ment, and formulated in genuine consultation with the popu-
lation. Such an approach might lead to a more sustainable
process of health sector reform, including real negotiations
with the donors on the priorities and the terms of inter-
national assistance.
In the face of all these considerations, the economic focus on
reform, with its emphasis on managerial restructuring and
cost containment in the health field, is potentially dangerous,
as it distracts attention from the principal issues that need to
be addressed in reform, and is not responsive to the popu-
lation’s needs. After all, it is not efficiency or the reform
process per se that is needed, but the construction of a health
system that will promote the social right to health develop-
ment for Palestinian citizens including the factors of quality
and of equity.
Endnotes
1 For details on the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which
is beyond the scope of this paper, see the ‘Question of Palestine’ on
the official UN site at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/index.
html]. This comprehensive site includes an historical overview of the
conflict, as well as relevant maps, UN documents, resolutions, and
other useful information.
2 www.un.org/unrwa
3 Due to the decrease in NGO primary health care clinics
during this same period, the overall number of clinics, particularly in
the West Bank, has not changed significantly (Government of Japan
and the World Bank 2000: 43).
4 For an interesting analysis of issues pertaining to inter-
national assistance to countries in transition from war to relative
peace see Macrae et al. (1995).
5 For an analysis of this question, see Giacaman (1997) and
Fargues (2000).
References
Balaj B, Wallich C. 1999. Aid coordination and post-conflict recon-
struction: the West Bank and Gaza Experience. Precis.
Washington, DC: World Bank Operations Evaluation Depart-
ment.
Barghouthi M, Lennock J. 1997. Health in OPT: Potential and chal-
lenges. Ramallah: OPT Economic Policy Research Institute
(MAS).
66 Rita Giacaman et al.
Health sector reform in the OPT 67
Barghouthi M, Giacaman R. 1990. The emergence of an infrastruc-
ture of resistance: the case of health. In: Nassar J, Heacock R
(eds). Intifada, OPT at the Crossroads. NY: Praeger, pp. 73–87.
Berman P (ed). 1995. Health sector reform in developing countries:
making health development sustainable. Boston: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS). 2000. Social Monitor 3,
p. 13.
Fargues P. 2000. Protracted national conflict and fertility change:
Palestinians and Israelis in the twentieth century. Population
and Development Review 26: 463–9.
Frisch H. 1997. Modern absolutist or neopatriarchal state building?
Customary law, extended families, and the Palestinian Auth-
ority. International Journal of Middle East Studies 9: 342.
Giacaman R. 1994. Health conditions and services in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. UNCTAD/ECDC/SEU/3.
Giacaman R. 1997. Population and fertility, Palestinian women: a
status report. Birzeit, OPT: Women’s Studies Program, Birzeit
University.
Giacaman G. 1998. In the throes of Oslo: Palestinian society, civil
society, and the future. In: Giacaman G, Lonning D (eds). After
Oslo: new realities, old problems. London: Pluto Press, pp. 1–51.
Giacaman G, Lonning D (eds). 1998. After Oslo: new realities, old
problems. London: Pluto Press.
Government of Japan and the World Bank. 2000. Aid effectiveness
in the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem: The Secretariat of the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee.
Hilal J. 1998a. The Palestinian political system after Oslo: a critical
analytical study. Ramallah, OPT: Muwatin, The Palestinian
Institute for the Study of Democracy (in Arabic).
Hilal J. 1998b. The effects of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian
political system. In: Giacaman G, Lonning D (eds). After Oslo:
new realities, old problems. London: Pluto Press, pp. 121–45.
Khawaja M. 2000. The recent rise in Palestinian fertility: permanent
or transient? Population Studies 54: 331.
Macrae J, Zwi A, Birungi H, 1995, A healthy peace? Rehabilitation
and development of the health sector in a post-conflict situation.
London: Department of Public Health and Policy, London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
McMichael A, Beaglehole R. 2000. The changing global context of
public health. The Lancet 356: 495–9.
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 1998a. Demographic statis-
tics: main indicators. Accessed online at [http://www.pcbs.org].
Updated September 13, 1998.
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 1998b. Women and men in
OPT: trends and statistics. Ramallah: PCBS.
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 1999. Population, Housing
and Establishment Census-1997, Final Results – Population
Report – Palestinian Territory. First Part. Ramallah, OPT:
PCBS.
Policy Research Incorporated. 1999. Social impact assessment, West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Bethesda, Maryland: Health System
Development Project.
Sanbar E. 1984. OPT 1948, L’Expulsion. Washington DC: Les Livres
de la Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes.
Sayigh Y, Shikaki K. 1999. Strengthening Palestinian public insti-
tutions. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations.
Sen K, Koivusal M. 1998. Health care reform and developing
countries: a critical overview. International Journal of Health
Planning and Management 13: 199–215.
Shu’aybi A, Shikaki K. 2000. A window on the workings of the PA:
an inside view. IPS Forum. Journal of OPT Studies XXX: 90.
Standing H. 1999. Framework for understanding gender inequalities
and health sector reform: an analysis and review of policy issues.
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
Thomason J. 1997. Health sector reform in developing countries: a
reality check. [http://www.acithn.uq.edu.au/conf97/papers97/
thomason.htm], Plenary paper from Australian Tropical Health
and Nutrition Conference, 17–19 July 1997, pp. 6–78.
World Bank. 1998. West Bank and Gaza: Medium-term development
strategy for the health sector. Washington DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2002. Fifteen Months, Intifada, Closures and Palestin-
ian Economic Crisis. An Assessment. March. Washington DC:
World Bank.
World Bank Group. 2001. One Year of Intifada. West Bank and
Gaza Update, November. Washington DC.
World Bank and United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator
in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO). 1999. Donor investment
in Palestinian development 1994–1998. Jerusalem: World Bank
and UNSCO.
Biographies
Rita Giacaman is Director of the Department of International Com-
munity Health at the Institute of Community and Public Health,
Birzeit University, Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Hanan F Abdul-Rahim and Laura Wick are researchers at the Insti-
tute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, Occupied
Palestinian Territories.
Correspondence: giacaman@baraka.org
